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Smith v. City of Jackson put to rest the oft-debated question: Are disparate
impact claims recognized under the ADEA? In answering this question in
the affirmative, the Supreme Court definitively settled the issue. However,
the Court also indicated that, while disparate impact claims are available,
employers need only reveal a reasonable employment goal as a defense, as
first outlined in Wards Cove v. Antonio. Although Title VII proved to be
vitally important to the Court in deciding Smith, the decision may be the
first step toward separating the ADEA from Title VII. By applying the
Wards Cove standard and beginning to distinguish Title VII from the
ADEA, the Supreme Court may have saved employers from increased
litigation in the form of age-based hostile work environment claims--a type
of claim just beginning to emerge-and may have reduced the claims
available when reductions in force occur.
I. INTRODUCTION
The impact of age discrimination in the workplace has often been
debated. Compare, for example, this following view: "Our findings indicate
that all too often older job seekers face barriers that are totally unrelated to
their ability to do the job";! with this one: "Yet no evidence exists of
widespread discrimination against these [older] workers." 2
Theoretically, age discrimination should not exist in the workplace-we
all grow older. Most workers will, at some point, reach age forty. At that
point, American workers enter the protected class defined by the Age
* B.S., The Ohio State University Fisher College of Business, 2003; J.D., The Ohio
State University Moritz College of Law, 2006 (expected). This Note would not have been
possible without the support and love of my family and friends. I must also give special
thanks to Daniel, for listening to my endless legal babble and for your love, support, and
welcome distractions. I also owe deep thanks to Stephanie Seeley for suggesting this
topic and to Kathy Kordeleski for her initial assistance on the subject.
I KERRY SEGRAVE, AGE DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYERS 152 (2001) (quoting
remarks made in 1994 by Claudia Withers, who was then Director of the Fair
Employment Council of Greater Washington).
2 Id. at 157 (quoting Gary S. Becker, What Keeps Older Workers off the Job Rolls,
BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 19, 1990, at 18).
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 3 One would hope that
discrimination on the basis of age would not exist in our society. It makes
little sense, analytically, for older workers to be discriminated against, as we
would all hope that in our "old" age, others would not discriminate against
us. Yet in spite of this, age discrimination still exists in today's workplace.
Nor is the problem of age discrimination new. "As far back as 1866
witnesses testified before a special Massachusetts commission that
woodcarvers and cabinet workers were economically old after the age of
40. '" 4 Colorado passed a law dealing with age discrimination in discharge
procedures in 1903 but it, like many other early laws, was not enforced.5
Nearly 100 years passed between those early testimonies and the passage of a
federal law addressing age discrimination in employment.
While the ADEA finally provided federal laws to protect older workers,
the extent of that protection is an oft-debated topic.6 The ADEA certainly
covers cases of intentional discrimination, so-called "disparate treatment"
cases. Disparate treatment cases involve direct acts of discrimination by
employers on the basis of age. This claim is universally accepted and can be
brought in any court in the United States.
Contrary to the universal acceptance of disparate treatment cases, the
status of disparate impact claims had, until recently, remained unclear. A
disparate impact claim alleges that an employer's policy, though facially
neutral, has an adverse impact on an older employee. 7 Disparate impact
claims were first recognized in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., a case brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8 In Griggs, the Supreme
Court struck down an employer's policy which required employees to hold a
3 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2004). The
section of the Act that designates individuals who are at least forty years of age as a
protected class is contained in 29 U.S.C. § 361(a) (2004).
4 SEGRAVE, supra note 1, at 4.
5Id.
6 See, for example, the debate on disparate impact. See infra notes 36-96 and
accompanying text.
7 Disparate impact can be more fully defined as "[t]he adverse effect of a facially
neutral practice (esp. an employment practice) that nonetheless discriminates against
persons because of their race, sex, national origin, age, or disability and that is not
justified by business necessity. Discriminatory intent is irrelevant in a disparate-impact
claim." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 504 (8th ed. 2004).
8 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) ("Under [Title VII],
practices, procedures, or tests neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."). Title
VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
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high school diploma.9 The Court declared that the policy had a disparate
impact on African American workers Who, because of historic
discrimination, generally had been denied access to a high school diploma.'0
This decision marked the beginning of the disparate impact claim.
While disparate impact claims are accepted in Title VII jurisprudence,
the availability of such claims under the ADEA only recently became clear.
Until early 2005, there was a split in the federal circuits regarding the
availability of such claims. The First, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits did not recognize disparate impact causes of action under the
ADEA, 11 while the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits all permitted such
claims. 12 Two other circuits, the D.C. and Sixth Circuits, had remained
ambivalent about the availability of the claim. 13
However, the Supreme Court answered the question with its March 2005
decision in Smith v. City of Jackson.14 The Supreme Court, after considering
arguments advanced by the parties and numerous amici, held that disparate
impact claims are recognized under the ADEA. However, the Court held
ADEA disparate impact plaintiffs to a higher standard of proof than Title VII
9 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
10 Id. at 430.
11 See, e.g., Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 696 (1st Cir. 1999); Smith v.
City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 184 (5th Cir. 2003); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41
F.3d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1994); Hiatt v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 65 F.3d 838, 842 (10th
Cir. 1995); Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1322 (11th Cir. 2001), cert.
granted, 534 U.S. 1054 (2001), and cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 535 U.S.
228 (2002). The Third Circuit has also expressed doubts about the availability of
disparate impact claims under the ADEA. See DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48
F.3d 719, 732 (3d Cir. 1995). District courts in both the Fourth and D.C. Circuits have
also refused to recognize such claims under the ADEA. See Fobian v. Storage Tech.
Corp., 959 F. Supp. 742, 746-47 (E.D. Va. 1997), affd, 217 F.3d 838, 838 (4th Cir.
2000); Evans v. Atwood, 38 F. Supp. 2d 25, 25 (D.D.C. 1999). However, it should be
noted that the D.C. Circuit never reached a conclusive stance on the availability of
disparate impact claims under the ADEA. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
12 See, e.g., Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 381 F.3d 56, 56 (2d Cir. 2004);
Lewis v. Aerospace Cmty. Credit Union, 114 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 1997); Frank v.
United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 2000).
13 See, e.g., Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n & Prof 1 Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 137-40
(6th Cir. 1995); Koger v. Reno, 98 F.3d 631, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
14 Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005). This was not the first time the
Court contemplated the issue. The Court had granted certiorari to Adams v. Florida
Power Co. in 2002-a case which would have also answered the question-but
dismissed the case as certiorari improvidently granted after hearing oral arguments. See
Adams v. Florida Power Co., 535 U.S. 228 (2002).
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disparate impact plaintiffs..15 With the newly announced opinion from the
Supreme Court, it becomes necessary to examine what impact the Court's
decision may have. The Court's endorsement of disparate impact claims
under the ADEA may create a flood of litigation in the courts. Allowing
disparate impact claims may expose employers to greater liability-first in
the form of hostile work environment claims, claims that, although not
widely recognized now, may grow; and second in the form of disparate
impact claims when employers undertake reductions in force.
In answering the disparate impact question, the Court also answered two
other questions: To what extent should the ADEA continue to be treated like
Title VII, and to what extent should the ADEA be recognized as an
independent area? Courts have routinely turned to Title VII when answering
questions concerning the substance and procedure of the ADEA. 16 The
analysis of the Court in Smith v. City of Jackson may finally serve as the
beginning step in distinguishing whether the ADEA will stand on its own or
continue to follow in the footsteps of other anti-discrimination statutes.
This Note examines the history of the ADEA and the historical debate
about the viability of disparate impact claims brought under the ADEA. With
this background in mind, this Note will then discuss the likely implications of
the Court's decision. Part II includes an examination of the evolution of the
ADEA and the arguments both for and against the recognition of disparate
impact claims under the Act. Part II also gives the details of the Smith case.
Part III examines how the Court's recognition of disparate impact claims
may open up other courts to new lawsuits of the following two types: (1)
lawsuits based on a new ADEA claim-hostile work environment claims,
and (2) discrimination lawsuits based on disparate impact in cases of an
employer's reduction in force. This potential opening for new litigation may
cause immense difficulties for employers and increase the amount of age
discrimination litigation in the courts. As a result, this Note urges courts to
15 See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1538.
16 See generally Daniel P. O'Meara, Protecting the Growing Number of Older
Workers: The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, in LABOR RELATIONS AND PUBLIC
POLICY SERIES No. 33, at 88 (1989) (discussing the manner in which both the Supreme
Court and lower courts have often applied Title VII case law and interpretations to the
ADEA). See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (interpreting
§ 14(b) of the ADEA by reference to § 706(c) of Title VII); Western Air Lines, Inc. v.
Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 416 (1985) (interpreting the ADEA's bona fide occupational
qualification clause in light of the similar exception contained in Title VII); Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 120-21 (1985) (denial of privileges cases under
the ADEA applied similarly to the cases under Title VII). Interestingly, the Supreme
Court, in the Smith opinion, cited the above examples as proof of the continued
relationship between the ADEA and Title VII. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1541 n.4.
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narrowly interpret the ADEA in order to protect both employers and the
dockets of the courts.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ARGUMENTS SURROUNDING THE ADEA
AND DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS
The problem of age discrimination was known well before 1967, when
the ADEA was passed by Congress. As early as 1903, states were legislating
on the issue. 17 As of 1965, twenty states had passed age discrimination
legislation. 18 However, the federal government was slower to take action.
The legislative history evidences the impetus for the ADEA and feeds the
debate as to whether disparate impact causes of action exist under the ADEA.
A. History of the ADEA
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 was not the first of
Congress's attempts to eliminate age discrimination. The first significant
attempt was in 1962,19 when the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1962
emerged from the House Education and Labor Committee. 20 That Act, which
never emerged from the House Rules Committee, would have prohibited
employment discrimination on the basis of age, race, color, national origin,
or ancestry.21 The second major attempt came in the congressional debates
surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1964, when Congress considered adding
age to the list of prohibited bases for discrimination. 22 This amendment,
however, was never adopted into law.23
17 Colorado was the first state to act, passing legislation in 1903. See SEGRAVE,
supra note 1, at 4.
18 Id. at 138.
19 Although Congress did not take up the cause of age discrimination until the early
1960s, the problem had surfaced years before. The problems of middle-aged employees
had been addressed both by individuals and states in the years prior to Congress's
actions. For a more complete history of the evolution of age discrimination, see
SEGRAVE, supra note 1.
20 H.R. REP. No. 87-1370, at 1 (1962).
21 See 110 CONG. REc. 2, 2599 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Pucinski).
22 The amendment was introduced by Senator Smathers of Florida. See 110 CONG.
REc. 8, 9911 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Smathers). As he introduced the amendment, the
Senator noted that he still opposed the bill, but considered the amendment an
improvement. Id.
23 Various reasons were offered for the exclusion of age from the prohibitions of
Title VII. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 2, 2596 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler) (claiming
insufficient information was available to legislate on the topic); 110 CONG. REC. 2, 2599
13792005]
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964 did, however, require the Secretary of
Labor to study the problem of age discrimination in the workplace. 24 This
report, entitled The Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in
Employment, was presented to Congress by Secretary of Labor W. Willard
Wirtz in June 1965.25 The report surfaces on both sides of the debate over the
viability of disparate impact claims brought under the ADEA. In examining
the problem of age discrimination, the report focused on arbitrary age
discrimination, finding "no significant evidence" of the intolerance seen in
cases involving race, religion, national origin, or color.26 This report
ultimately served as the impetus for the ADEA. Interestingly enough, the
report also served an important role in the disparate impact debate. 27
From 1965 to 1966 there was no significant progress in the recognition
and elimination of age discrimination.28 In 1967, Secretary Wirtz submitted a
bill to Congress entitled the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
(1964) (remarks of Rep. Goodell) (finding that Title VII was not designed to include
age). Interestingly, age was proposed as an addition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by
opponents who hoped to make the Act so broad and unwieldy as to be ineffective.
O'Meara, supra note 16, at 11-12. Recognizing the tactics of the opposition, supporters
of the Civil Rights Act did not support the addition of age. See 110 CONG. REc. 2, 2598
(1964) (remarks of Rep. Roosevelt) (noting that restraint was required to help with the
passage and effectiveness of the bill).
24 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265.
The Secretary of Labor shall make a full and complete study of the factors
which might tend to result in discrimination in employment because of age and of
the consequences of such discrimination on the economy and individuals affected.
The Secretary of Labor shall make a report to the Congress not later than June 30,
1965, containing the results of such study and shall include in such report such
recommendations for legislation to prevent arbitrary discrimination in employment
because of age as he determines advisable.
Id.
25 SEC'Y OF LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1965), Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536
(2005) (No. 03-1160), available at 2004 WL 2289230 at jt. app. *32 [hereinafter THE
OLDER AMERICAN WORKER].
26 Id. at *43.
27 This report is also relied on extensively by the majority in Smith. See Smith v.
City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536,1540 (2005).
28 Congress considered an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) that,
among other changes, would have outlawed age discrimination; however, this
amendment was originally rejected by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare and, after the amendment was successfully added on the floor, it was eliminated
in conference. See O'Meara, supra note 16, at 13-14. The final amendments to the FLSA
did, however, require the Secretary of Labor to submit specific recommendations to
Congress. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 606, 80
Stat. 830, 845 (1966).
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1967.29 The Secretary's submission ultimately provided the basis for the
ADEA as passed by Congress. In fact, "there was no significant opposition to
[the bill] in Congress" and few people showed great concern over the details
of the bill.30 Likewise, little attention was given to the bill by the news
outlets. 31 Many anticipated that few claims would be filed under the new
law, thus it attracted little attention. 32 However, these early estimates proved
to be grossly inadequate as the number of charges filed under the ADEA
quickly grew to more than 20,000 per year. 33 Since its passage in 1967, the
ADEA has been amended several times.34 However, none of the amendments
29 See 113 CONG. REc. 1, 1377 (1967).
30 O'Meara, supra note 16, at 14.
31 Id.
32 Early predictions were that no more than 1000 charges would be filed per year.
See Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on S. 830, S. 788 Before the Subcomm.
on Labor of the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong. 46 (1967).
33 The number of charges filed quickly grew from 1031 in 1969 to 5374 in 1979, a
mere ten years later. See O'Meara, supra note 16, at 30, Table 1-6. The number of cases
rose rapidly from 1979 to 1985, with nearly 25,000 charges filed in 1985. Id. For a
discussion of the increase in the number of charges, see O'Meara, supra note 16, at 29-
33.
34 The 1974 amendment included federal employees and decreased the minimum
number of employees required for a business to be covered from twenty-five to twenty.
Fair Labor Standards Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55, 74-76
(1974). The amendment of 1978 (1) changed the employee benefit plan defense, (2)
increased the upper age cap from sixty-five to seventy, (3) outlawed mandatory
retirement because of age for most of the federal government, (4) changed many
procedural aspects of the ADEA, and (5) codified the right to jury under the ADEA
pronounced by the court in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 585 (1978). Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat.
189 (1978).
In 1984, the ADEA was amended once again as part of the Older Americans Act
Amendments of 1984. See Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
459, §§ 802-03, 98 Stat. 1767, 1792-93 (1984). The 1984 amendment accomplished two
things: (1) it extended coverage to Americans who were employed overseas by American
firms, and (2) it raised the minimum annual pension to which an employee must be
entitled for mandatory retirement. Id. at 1792. Congress acted again two years later,
passing the Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
592, 100 Stat. 3342 (1986). The amendment altered some of the provisions for
firefighters, police officers, and prison guards, as well as for tenured faculty and people
subject to collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 3342-45. More importantly, this
amendment removed the upper limit of the protected age group (which was previously set
at seventy) and eliminated mandatory retirement based on age. Id The ADEA was also
amended in 1991 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See infra note 122 and
accompanying text. Provisions of the ADEA involving employee benefit plans and
2005] 1381
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considered or passed by Congress has dealt directly with the viability of
disparate impact claims under the ADEA.35 The lack of congressional action
is one of the many factors that has been discussed at length in the debate over
whether courts should recognize disparate impact claims.
B. The Raging Debate
The status of disparate impact claims under the ADEA had been debated
for well over a decade without a clear answer. 36 However, the agencies
charged with enforcing the ADEA have always indicated that such claims are
recognizable under the Act.37 Both the Secretary of Labor, the party
originally charged with enforcement, and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have concluded for years that disparate
impact claims are viable.38 Initially, the majority of courts also adopted this
position.39 However, after the Supreme Court case of Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins,40 the positions of the lower courts started to shift. The Second,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, relying largely on pre-Hazen Paper precedent,
statutes of limitations were also amended at various times; however, for purposes of this
Note, these amendments are not relevant. See O'Meara, supra note 16, at 19.
35 See supra note 34; see also infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
36 Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What a Difference ADEA Makes: Why Disparate
Impact Theory Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 N.C.
L. REv. 267, 270-71 (1995).
37 Contra Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1549 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment).
38 See Final Interpretations: Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 46 Fed. Reg.
47,724, 47,725 (Sept. 29, 1981); Age Discrimination in Employment, 33 Fed. Reg. 9172,
9173 (June 21, 1968); Age Discrimination in Employment, 34 Fed. Reg. 322, 322-23
(Jan. 9, 1963) (This section notes that employee testing will be carefully scrutinized to
ensure that the test specifically relates to the job requirements, is fair and reasonable, and
does not discriminate on the basis of age. Testing in particular will be carefully examined
to ensure that the test itself is not unfair to older individuals who may not be as test savvy
as younger individuals, thus indicating that an otherwise fair test may still violate the Act
if it has an adverse impact on the workers protected by the ADEA.).
3 9 See 8 EMP. CooRD. EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES § 107:12, July 2005, available at
EMPC EMPLOYMENT § 107:12 (Westlaw) [hereinafter EMP. COORD. § 107:12] (The
courts initially accepted the disparate impact claim theory based on the similarity in
language, structure, purpose, and substantive provisions of the ADEA and Title VII.
Other courts applied it or allowed it to be applied without announcing a basis for its
validity.); Brief of the Petitioners at 10, Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005)
(No. 03-1160), available at 2004 WL 1369172 (noting that claims based on the disparate
impact theory were "uniformly recognized by the courts of appeals until 1993")
[hereinafter Brief of the Petitioners].
40 Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
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continued to allow disparate impact claims.41 However, the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all refused to recognize the
disparate impact cause of action under the ADEA in the years following the
Hazen Paper decision.42
Both sides of the debate turn to the statutory construction of the ADEA,
the legislative history of the Act, and the general policies concerning the
disparate impact theory. However, courts reviewing the same evidence have
reached contradictory conclusions. The following discussion seeks to briefly
outline the main arguments presented by both sides of the debate and relied
on in lower courts prior to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Smith.
1. The Pro-Disparate Impact Side
Prior to Smith, the threshold argument for the pro-disparate impact
debate was to clarify that the debate was still open and that the Supreme
Court had not decided the issue.43 This argument was based on the Hazen
Paper decision, the same decision that many in the other camp used to argue
that such claims are not cognizable. In Hazen Paper, the Supreme Court
noted that it had "never decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability
is available under the ADEA, and [it] need not do so here." 44 Thus, the
general backlash and retreat from the majority position of the pre-Hazen
Paper years may be unfounded and not a good platform on which to base an
opinion.
The relationship (or lack thereof) between Hazen Paper and disparate
impact claims, however, is not that simple. While Hazen Paper did not
specifically decide whether disparate impact claims are available under the
ADEA, the Court did announce that disparate treatment claims, rather than
disparate impact claims, "capture[] the essence of what Congress sought to
prohibit in the ADEA.' '45 Proponents of disparate impact claims noted that
"'the essence' is not the same thing as 'the entirety,' 46 and that similar
41 EMP. COORD. § 107:12, supra note 39.
42 See id. The First Circuit, prior to the Hazen Paper decision, had allowed disparate
impact cases. Id. District courts in both the Fourth and the D.C. Circuits have also refused
to recognize the availability of disparate impact claims under the ADEA. Id.
43 In fact, Justice Stevens's plurality opinion tackled this question, noting that "[i]n
sum, there is nothing in our opinion in Hazen Paper that precludes an interpretation of
the ADEA that parallels our holding in Griggs." Smith v. City of Jackson 125 S. Ct.
1536, 1543 (2005) (plurality opinion).
44 Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610 (citation omitted).
45 1d. at 610.
46 Brief of the Petitioners, supra note 39, at 27.
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statements were made by the Court regarding the essence of Title VII, 47 yet
disparate impact claims are still allowed under Title VII. 48
Having established that, at a minimum, the Court's decision in Hazen
Paper did not automatically preclude disparate impact claims, the argument
in favor of such claims almost universally turned to a discussion of the
legislative histories and similarities of Title VII and the ADEA. An
examination of the substantive text of the two laws showcases the
similarities:
Title VII The ADEA
"[T]o limit, segregate, or "[T]o limit, segregate, or
classify his employees or classify his employees in any
applicants for employment in way which would deprive or
any way which would deprive tend to deprive any individual
or tend to deprive any of employment opportunities or
individual of employment otherwise adversely affect his
opportunities or otherwise status as an employee, because
adversely affect his status as an of such individual's age." 50
employee, because of such
individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national
origin.' 49
When the Secretary of Labor drafted a proposed bill for Congress to
consider-the bill that later became the ADEA-Title VII had already been
passed as a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 51 The language similarity
was not coincidental as "the prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec
verba from Title VII. '' 52 The above language of Title VII was heavily relied
upon by the Court in creating the disparate impact cause of action.53 Courts
recognizing the availability of disparate impact claims under the ADEA
47 See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
("Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when
it enacted Title VII.").
48 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
49 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000).
50 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2000).
51 See supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
52 Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978).
53 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429, 432 (relying on § 703(a)(2), the Court noted that
"[t]he objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of
the statute" and the goal of the section was to address "the consequences of employment
practices, not simply the motivation.").
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pointed to the similarity in language between Title VII and the ADEA and
the Court's reliance upon the similar text in Griggs as the basis for allowing
plaintiffs to proceed with their claims. 54 Importing disparate impact analysis
from Title VII to the ADEA will not be the first time the Court has imported
a meaning from Title VII to the ADEA. In Trans World Airlines v. Thurston,
the Court applied a substantive legal rule from Title VII to the ADEA.55
There is another important link between the ADEA and Title VII. Title
VII was amended in 1991 to expressly include the availability of disparate
impact claims under the Act.56 In this amendment, Congress also intended
54 See, e.g., Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1031-32 (2d Cir. 1980); Leftwich v.
Harris-Stowe State Coll., 702 F.2d 686, 690 (8th Cir. 1983); Douglas v. Anderson, 656
F.2d 528, 531 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981).
55 Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 120-21 (1985) (citing Hishon v.
King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984)). The imported rule said that even when
employers are not required to give out a benefit, they cannot selectively offer such a
benefit in a manner that is discriminatory. Id. at 121. See also supra note 16.
56 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071
(1991). The purpose of this amendment to Title VII was, among other reasons, to
specifically "confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the
adjudication of disparate impact suits under title [sic] VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964." Id. Congress was motivated to act by the Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). The Court's decision in that case significantly raised
the burden on Title VII disparate impact plaintiffs by requiring more than a simple
statistical disparity in the workforce. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-57. First, in
establishing a prima facie case, the correct comparison is the racial composition of the
jobs in question and the pool of qualified applicants. JOSEPH E. KALET, AGE
DIsCRiMINATION N EMPLOYMENT LAW 73 (2d ed. 1990). Further, the plaintiff "must
demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or particular employment practice that
has created the disparate impact under attack." Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657. The Court
also overruled all cases "requiring an employer to show that the challenged practice was
'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business, because that degree of scrutiny
would be almost impossible for most employers to meet." KALET, supra, at 79. These
changes made it much more difficult for an employee to support his or her claim and
simultaneously made it easier for employers to defend Title VII disparate impact claims.
Id. at 87. While the employer has the burden of producing evidence of a business
justification after the plaintiff has proven a prima facie case, the Wards Cove Court also
held that the plaintiff held the ultimate burden of persuasion. See Ernest F. Lidge III,
Financial Costs as a Defense to an Employment Discrimination Claim, 58 ARK. L. REV.
1, 27 (2005). Many feared that the Supreme Court was attempting to eliminate disparate
impact claims by placing such a heavy burden on the plaintiff. Kingsley R. Browne, The
Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill," a Codification of Griggs, a Partial Return to
Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 287, 290-92 (1993)
(describing the "firestorm" that the Wards Cove decision created). As a result, Congress
codified the right to disparate impact claims into Title VII. Lidge, supra, at 27-29. The
reasoning behind Wards Cove once again became significant in Smith, as the Supreme
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for the disparate impact protection to extend to antidiscrimination laws based
upon Title VII.57 Proponents, therefore, argued that because the ADEA was
clearly based upon the language of Title VII, the disparate impact theory of
liability must also extend to claims brought under the ADEA.58 Although
opponents pointed out that Congress specifically amended Title VII but
failed to directly amend the ADEA, courts have been cautioned against
reading into legislative silence. 59
Additionally, courts also noted the similar purposes behind the ADEA
and Title VII. Title VII sought to eliminate discrimination in the
workplace; 60 the ADEA certainly shares a similar purpose. Specifically,
Congress articulated three purposes in passing the ADEA: "to promote
employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers
and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age
on employment."'61 The Court used the purpose of Title VII to support the
Griggs decision.62 If the purpose of eliminating discrimination in the race
context lent support to the use of disparate impact analysis, then supporters
argued that the similar purpose of the ADEA in the age context should
likewise provide support for disparate impact analysis.
Court determined that the proper analysis under the ADEA for disparate impact claims is
the scheme outlined in Wards Cove. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1545
(2005).
57 EMP. CooRD. § 107:12, supra note 39 (explaining that Congress meant the
disparate impact cause of action "to apply to antidiscrimination laws which have been
modeled after and interpreted consistently with Title VII"). See also H.R. REP. No. 102-
40, pt. 2, at 4 (1991).
58 The Supreme Court first noted the similarity in substantive provisions between
Title VII and the ADEA, noting that the ADEA provisions were derived in haec verba
from Title VII. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). In the years following
Lorillard, courts have often taken substance from Title VII and applied it to the ADEA.
See infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text. Thus, since there has been continued
borrowing from Title VII, courts should also borrow the disparate impact cause of action
from Title VII and apply it to the ADEA as well. See O'Meara, supra note 16, at 138-39.
59 Courts refusing to recognize the disparate impact cause of action under the ADEA
have cautioned sister circuits against such interpretations. See Schneidewind v. ANR
Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 306 (1988), construed in Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d
183, 186 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that looking into congressional inaction can create
varying readings; courts should use caution before using such logic).
60 See, e.g., Michael C. Falk, Note, Lost in the Language: The Conflict Between the
Congressional Purpose and Statutory Language of Federal Employment Discrimination
Legislation, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1179, 1189 (2004) (noting the driving purpose behind Title
VII was "[t]o improve employment prospects for African-Americans by eradicating
discrimination by employers.").
61 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2000).
62 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-36 (1971).
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The other main argument upon which proponents of the disparate impact
theory of liability under the ADEA rely was based upon the EEOC
regulations. 63 As early as 1968, the agency charged with ADEA
enforcement 64 has recognized that disparate impact claims are available
under the Act.65 Likewise, the EEOC incorporated and relied on the Court's
decision in Griggs in allowing disparate impact claims under the ADEA. 66
Another important factor was that the EEOC's interpretations of the ADEA
were published in the Federal Register, with an invitation for public
comment before being implemented. 67 Thus, the EEOC regulations were
created pursuant to a "note and comment" form of regulation and are true to
the precedents of the Court. As such, they are entitled to deference pursuant
to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.68
63 For regulations prior to 1979, the courts also turn to the regulations of the
Department of Labor, the party charged with enforcement of the provisions in the ADEA
before the responsibility was transferred to the EEOC. See Equal Employment
Opportunity, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807, 19,807 (May 9, 1978).
64 The original agency charged with enforcement was the Department of Wages and
Hours within the Department of Labor. The EEOC is currently charged with
enforcement. Both agencies' regulations have recognized the availability of disparate
impact claims under the ADEA. See Keith R. Fentonmiller, The Continuing Validity of
Disparate Impact Analysis for Federal-Sector Age Discrimination, 47 AM. U. L. REV.
1071, 1105-07 (1998).
65 See Age Discrimination in Employment, 33 Fed. Reg. 9172, 9172-73 (June 21,
1968).
Evaluation factors such as quantity or quality of production, or education level,
would be acceptable bases for differentiation when, in the individual case, such
factors are shown to have a valid relationship to job requirements and where the
criteria or personnel policy establishing such factors are applied uniformly to all
employees, regardless of age.
Id. at 9173. Similarly, the Department of Labor explicitly went over the requirements for
testing to be valid nondiscriminatory methods. Age Discrimination in Employment, 34
Fed. Reg. 322, 322-23 (Jan. 9, 1969). Because otherwise valid testing will be carefully
monitored to ensure that it does not adversely impact older workers who may be less test-
savvy, the Department of Labor is advocating a disparate impact theory of liability. See
id.
66 See Final Interpretations: Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 46 Fed. Reg.
47,724, 47,725 (Sept. 29, 1981).
67 See id. at 47,724.
68 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Justice Scalia relied heavily on this argument in his concurring opinion in Smith. See
Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1546 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). This may
prove important, as Justice Scalia's reliance on Chevron deference cast the critical fifth
vote in holding that disparate impact claims are viable under the ADEA. Justice Scalia
did not join in Part III of Justice Stevens's opinion, which examined many of the
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The final oft-found argument prior to Smith was actually a response to
the opponents of ADEA disparate impact claims, who often pointed to
similarities between the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act (EPA). 69 In response,
courts and commentators who approved of disparate impact claims noted that
the ADEA's exception for decisions based on "reasonable factors other than
age" (RFOA) is compatible with a disparate impact cause of action. 70 The
EPA only requires the existence of a neutral factor; whereas the ADEA
requires the employer to demonstrate the reasonableness of the challenged
factor-a burden essentially identical to that of disparate impact claims.
2. The Anti-Disparate Impact Side
If Hazen Paper was the threshold argument for all courts allowing
disparate impact claims prior to Smith, the detractors used Hazen Paper as
strong evidence that disparate impact claims are precluded under the
ADEA. 7 1 Courts turned to general aspects of the Hazen Paper decision when
addressing the question. The first aspect is the Hazen Paper Court's
declaration that disparate treatment claims "capture[] the essence of what
arguments advanced in the debate and made an independent decision by the plurality that
disparate impact claims are recognized by the ADEA. See id. at 1539-44 (plurality
opinion).
69 See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
70 See e.g., Brief of the Petitioners, supra note 39, at 17-21. By recognizing the
RFOA clause, proponents of ADEA disparate impact claims argue that there can be no
disparate impact claim unless the factor other than age is unreasonable. If disparate
impact claims are not available, then there is no need to require an analysis of any factor
other than age-as long as the employer did not use age as the deciding factor, there
could be no claim. Id.
[T]he RFOA provision cannot be read to shield from liability any category of
intentional discrimination on the basis of age: by its very language, it applies only
when employees are treated differently on the basis of some other factor. This
provision necessarily implies that it is possible to violate section 4(a) through
differentiation based on a factor other than age-that is, without having a
discriminatory purpose.
Id. at 19. For a further discussion of the relationship and implications of the Equal Pay
Act and ADEA, see infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
71 EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding the
Court's discussion of the ADEA in Hazen Paper to be "instructive"); see generally
Zachary L. Karmen, Annotation, Disparate Impact Claims Under Age Discrimination Act
of 1967, §§ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621 et seq., 186 A.L.R. Fed. 1, § 2 (2003) (noting
many courts have used the case to preclude disparate impact claims under the ADEA).
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Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA."'72 If Congress's intent is captured
within a disparate treatment claim, opponents argued, then there is no room
for the application of a disparate impact claim. The second aspect actually
looked to the concurring opinion in Hazen Paper, which explicitly addresses
the case's impact on the availability of disparate impact claims under the
ADEA. The concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy, which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined, explicitly states that "nothing in the
Court's opinion should be read as incorporating in the ADEA context the so-
called 'disparate impact' theory of Title VII. '' 73 The concurring opinion also
notes the existence of "substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over
disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA." 74
The final argument hinged upon the Court's declaration that some
decisions, such as those based on pension status, which often but do not
always correlate with age, do not carry the problem of "inaccurate and
stigmatizing stereotypes. ' '75 Prior to Smith, courts argued that this language
was incompatible with the theory of disparate impact, which does not require
a showing of intent.76
Courts that prohibited disparate impact claims also turned to an analysis
of the ADEA and Title VII.77 In examining the relationship between Title
VII and the ADEA, courts that did not recognize ADEA disparate impact
claims focused on the differences between the two Acts. 78 Such courts
focused on two key differences. They first looked to Section (2) of Title VII,
which includes the phrase "or applicants for employment"-a phrase
glaringly absent from the ADEA's parallel provision.79 Thus, in cases
involving job applicants, many courts refused to recognize any type of
disparate impact claim, even if the same claim would be cognizable under
72 Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) ("It is the very essence of age
discrimination for an older employee to be fired because the employer believes that
productivity and competence decline with old age.").
73 Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
74 Id.
75 1d. at 611.
76 Karmen, supra note 71, at 18. In a disparate treatment claim, liability rests upon
whether or not the decision was based upon the age of the plaintiff. Hazen Paper, 507
U.S. at 610. Thus it is critical to the plaintiff's case to prove a discriminatory intent on the
part of the defendant. Karmen, supra note 71, at 18. In contrast, disparate impact claims
do not require a showing of discriminatory intent, as they arise from practices that are
facially neutral, but negatively impact the protected group more that others. Id.
77 See, e.g., EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994).
78 See id. ("In the relevant statutory provisions, however, Title VII and the ADEA
differ in a significant way.").
7 9 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
2005] 1389
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Title VII's provisions if the decision had been based on race rather than on
age.80
The second textual difference often noted between the ADEA and Title
VII involves the RFOA provision. Prior to Smith, many interpreted this
phrase to exclude decisions based on other factors that happened to correlate
with age-the basis of any disparate impact claim.8' The RFOA language of
the ADEA was likened to similar language present in the EPA, which
permits differences in pay between genders for "factor[s] other than sex."8 2
Perhaps more importantly, the EPA's phrase has been construed as
prohibiting disparate impact claims.83 Thus courts, in denying the recognition
80 See e.g., Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at 1077-78 (finding the exclusion of
this language, particularly given the nearly verbatim language otherwise present in the
ADEA, to be quite persuasive).
81 See e.g., id. at 1077 ("It suggests that decisions which are made for reasons
independent of age but which happen to correlate with age are not actionable under the
ADEA.").
82 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000).
83 See, e.g., Colby v. J.C. Penney, Inc., 811 F.2d 1119, 1127 (7th Cir. 1987); Am.
Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 723 (7th Cir. 1986) (accepting that the Bennett
Amendment precludes disparate impact claims based on wage discrimination in dicta);
Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001); Mullin v. Raytheon
Co., 164 F.3d 696, 702 (1st Cir. 1999) (suggesting in dicta that "the exception eliminates
disparate impact from the armamentarium of weapons available to plaintiffs under the
Equal Pay Act and, correspondingly, confines the scope of liability to instances of
intentional discrimination, that is, to instances of disparate treatment"); Ellis v. United
Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1008 (10th Cir. 1996). Decisions such as these almost
universally rely on the Supreme Court case of County of Washington v. Gunther, 452
U.S. 161 (1981) (holding that employers may be successful if "their pay differentials are
based on a bona fide use of 'other factors other than sex"'). Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170. In
reaching this result, the Court turned to the legislative history of the EPA:
[L]anguage of the Bennett Amendment-barring sex-based wage discrimination
claims under Title VII where the pay differential is "authorized" by the Equal Pay
Act-suggests an intention to incorporate into Title VII only the affirmative
defenses of the Equal Pay Act, not its prohibitory language requiring equal pay for
equal work, which language does not "authorize" anything at all. Nor does this
construction of the Amendment render it superfluous.
Id. at 162 (syllabus).
However, there seems to be some rising debate about the availability of disparate
impact claims under the ADEA. For example, in EEOC v. JC. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249
(6th Cir. 1988), the court specifically found that the language in the EPA can allow a
disparate impact claim. Id. at 253. Specifically, the court noted the following:
Penney contends that the Bennett Amendment precludes any claim of wage
discrimination based on disparate impact, arguing that the Equal Pay Act allows a
wage differential if it is based on any factor other than sex, so that a claim of
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of disparate impact claims under the ADEA, imported the interpretation of
the EPA's phrase to the ADEA.
Another argument rested upon an interpretation of the phrase "because
of," which appears in § 4(a)(2). In examining the common usage of "because
of,"84 several courts and commentators argued that this phrase requires that
"the motivating factor" 85 behind the employer's decision must be age. 86
Further, a natural construction of the statute shows that the "because of'
phrase "modifies the entire enumeration of employer practices and not just
practices which 'otherwise adversely affect' an employee's status." 87 Thus,
some argued, disparate impact claims, which, by their very nature do not
require a "motivating factor" are necessarily barred. In other words, "because
of' was read as requiring intent.88
Beyond the textual differences between Title VII and the ADEA are
several historical differences that tended to impact the analysis of the
disparate impact debate. First, courts not recognizing the viability of
disparate impact claims under the ADEA often pointed to Congress's failure
to amend the ADEA to allow disparate impact claims while simultaneously
discrimination based on the disparate impact resulting from the use of this factor
would automatically be barred....
In our circuit, however, the Bennett Amendment cannot constitute a blanket bar
to all claims of wage discrimination based on disparate impact because the "factor
other than sex" defense does not include literally any other factor, but a factor that,
at a minimum, was adopted for a legitimate business reason.
Id. at 253 (internal citations omitted). Other courts have reached similar conclusions. See,
e.g., Cullen v. Ind. Bd. of Trustees, 338 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he EPA does
not require proof of discriminatory intent."); Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963
F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1992) (requiring that the "employer prove[] that the job
classification system resulting in differential pay is rooted in legitimate business-related
differences in work responsibilities and qualifications for the particular positions at
issue").
84 "By reason of; on account of." WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 98
(Margery S. Berube, et. al. eds., Houghton Mifflin Co. 1995). Reason is further defined
as "1. The basis or motive for an action, decision or belief. 2. A declaration explaining or
justifying an action, decision, or belief... 3. An underlying fact or motive that provides
logical sense for a premise or occurrence . I.." d. at 923.
85 Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993).
86 Brief of the National League of Cities, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 7, Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005) (No. 03-1160),
available at 2004 WL 1905734, at *7.
87 Id. at8.
88 Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536
(2005) (No. 03-1160), available at 2004 U.S. TRANS. LEXIS 61, at *45. Respondents in
the Smith v. City of Jackson case have urged that such language indicates that "[t]his
statute is preoccupied with intent." Id.
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amending Title VII to explicitly allow such claims. 89 The Civil Rights Act of
1991, which amended Title VII, did not amend the ADEA in regard to
disparate impact claims; however, it did amend the ADEA in other ways. 90
Thus, Congress specifically failed to add a disparate impact cause of action
to the ADEA although it had a prime opportunity to do so.
Another argument was based on the ADEA's legislative history. Many
found that an examination of the history of the ADEA does not support a
conclusion that disparate impact claims were intended under the Act.9 1
Specifically, Secretary Wirtz concluded that at its core, age discrimination
differed from race discrimination:
The gist of the matter is that "discrimination" means something very
different, so far as employment practices involving age are concerned, from
what it means in connection with discrimination involving-for example-
race....
Employment discrimination because of race is identified, in the general
understanding of it, with non-employment resulting from feelings about
people entirely unrelated to their ability to do the job. There is no
significant discrimination of this kind so far as older workers are
concerned. 92
Secretary Wirtz's report continued to distinguish discrimination based
upon age and race. For example, the report notes that employment
discrimination under Title VII is often motivated by prejudices originating
outside of the employment sphere; yet "[t]here are no such prejudices in
American life which apply to older persons and which would carry over so
strongly into the sphere of employment. '93 According to the report, the
89 See Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 703 (1st Cir. 1999); Ellis v. United
Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1008 (10th Cir. 1996).
90 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.102-166, § 115, 105 Stat. 1071.
91 See, e.g., A. Blumrosen, Interpreting the ADEA: Intent of Impact?, in AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT: A COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION MANUAL FOR
LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 68, 73 (Monte B. Lake ed., 1982) ("Th[e]
legislative history [of the ADEA] drives the reader to the conclusion that 'intent' to
discriminate on the basis of age was the gravemen of age discrimination, and that actions
which have 'adverse effect' on older workers were not to be considered illegal.").
92 THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 25, at *37.
93 Id. at *43-44.
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elderly are not discriminated against outside of the employment sphere
because gradually everyone grows older.94
Other comments in the legislative history of the ADEA also recognize
the differences between race and age discrimination. 95 The legislative history
of Title VII may also suggest that Congress considered age discrimination to
be different from discrimination on the basis of, for example, race, as
Congress specifically rejected adding "age" as an illegal basis for
discrimination.96
A final argument attempted to distinguish the policies underlying the
Griggs decision from those upon which the arguments for disparate impact
claims under the ADEA are based. The Griggs decision rested upon the
critical fact that African Americans historically -had been discriminated
against in the educational fields and that the employer was using this
historical fact as a means of presently discriminating against African
Americans. 97 However, older employees have not faced this historical
resistance. 98 The employer in Griggs also used the new policy as a means of
indirect segregation-such practices are not likely for older workers, as many
companies are run by older white males. 99
The Supreme Court finally provided an answer to this debate in March
2005. Smith v. City of Jackson firmly presented the Court with the question
of whether or not disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA.
94 Id. at *44. Because everyone ages, there are generally people of all ages living "in
close association rather than in separate and distinct social or economic environments [as
one may find people of separate races, religions, etc.]." Id.
95 See Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings Before the General Subcomm.
on Labor of the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 90th Cong. 40 (1967) (comments of
Rep. Dent, Chairman of House Subcommittee on Labor) ("I personally believe this is a
problem that ought not to be mixed up or confused in the area of discriminations that we
have been dealing with in recent years regarding sex, national origin, race, or color."); id.
at 449 (comments of Rep. Burke) ("Age discrimination is not the same as the insidious
discrimination based on race or creed prejudices and bigotry. Those discriminations result
in nonemployment because of feelings about a person entirely unrelated to his ability to
do a job. This is hardly a problem for the older job seeker.").
96 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. Congress also rejected a proposal
in 1967 to amend Title VII to add age discrimination. See O'Meara, supra note 16, at
141.
97 See O'Meara, supra note 16, at 140 ("The Court in Griggs was concerned with
personnel policies that operated to freeze the status quo of prior discriminatory practices,
and with educational segregation that resulted in built-in headwinds.").
98 See id. Older employees, rather than facing "headwinds" have often received the
benefits of "tailwinds" such as annual pay increases. Id.
99 See id. at 141. Studies have also shown that older white males receive the most
assistance under the ADEA. Id.
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Although the Court had declined to answer this question previously, Smith
finally provides a concrete answer.
C. Smith v. City of Jackson
On October 1, 1998, the city of Jackson, Mississippi implemented a new
performance pay plan for its police officers ("the plan") with the stated
purpose of making its compensation schemes more competitive with other
public sector agencies. 00 The plan was revised on March 1, 1999.101 Under
the terms of the plan, officers and dispatchers with fewer than five years of
tenure received proportionately greater increases in pay than those with
greater than five years of tenure. 102 As a result of the implementation of the
plan, older officers received raises that were four standard deviations lower
than the raises awarded to younger officers. 103 On May 1, 2001, thirty
officers and dispatchers over the age of forty sued the city, claiming that the
pay plan had a disparate impact on the class of employees protected by the
ADEA. °4 The plaintiffs also alleged that the plan resulted in disparate
treatment under the ADEA.105
The case was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi. 10 6 During the course of discovery, several disputes
arose between the parties. 10 7 Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were not
complying with discovery orders and ultimately moved for sanctions and to
strike portions of the defendants' experts' reports. 108 While these motions
100 The official purpose of the performance pay plan was "[t]o provide a
compensation plan that will attract and retain qualified people, provide incentive for
performance, maintain competitiveness with other public sector agencies and ensure
equitable compensation to all employees regardless of age, sex, race and/or disability."
Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005) (No. 03-1160), available at 2004 WL
2289230 atjt. app. *15.
101 Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 2003).
102 Id.
103 Brief of the Petitioners, supra note 39 at 5.
104 Id. The plaintiffs also alleged that the plan resulted in disparate treatment under
the ADEA. Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 184 (5th Cir. 2003). The district
court ultimately dismissed this claim; however, the Fifth Circuit remanded the issue on
appeal. See id. For purposes of this Note, the disparate treatment claims are not discussed
in detail.
105 Smith, 351 F.3d at 184.
106 Id. at 183.
107 See id. at 185.
108 Brief of Appellants at 3, Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003)
(No. 02-60850), available at 2002 WL 32387897.
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were still pending, the district court judge granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims and dismissed the plaintiffs'
motions as moot.109 The district court, without issuing an opinion, concluded
that the disparate impact theory is not recognized under the ADEA." I 0
Plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Fifth Circuit, alleging that the
district court erred in its conclusion that disparate impact claims are not
viable claims under the ADEA. 111 The question was a matter of first
impression before the court; thus, the court thoroughly analyzed the issue.
The court first noted that its analysis was not based upon the silence of
Congress regarding disparate impact claims under the ADEA in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.112 Rather, the court examined both the similarities and
differences between Title VII and the ADEA. 113 While recognizing the
similarity in language between the prohibitory sections of the two laws, the
court was ultimately persuaded that the "reasonable factors other than age"
clause of the ADEA "create[d] a critical 'asymmetry' between the ADEA
and Title VII. 11 4 The differences between the two statutes also persuaded
the court that the rule of in pari materia was not applicable to the question at
hand.115
The court was, however, persuaded by the similarities between the
language of the ADEA and the EPA,"16 and held that the language in the
ADEA was not a defense to a disparate impact claim, but prohibited all such
claims. 117 Finally, the court turned to the legislative history and policy
considerations of the ADEA, ultimately concluding that the driving concerns
behind the recognition of disparate impact claims under Title VII were absent
109 Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 2003).
110 See id.
I Id.
112 See id. at 186 n. 1. The court declined to draw inferences from the legislative
silence regarding disparate impact claims under the ADEA in the Civil Rights Act of
1991, although the same Act specifically reserved disparate impact claims under Title VII
and amended the ADEA in other ways. See id The court found that the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 was not particularly probative as to the question before it, as its main purpose
was to override certain judicial interpretations of Title VII. See id.
113 See Smith, 351 F.3d at 188-93.
114 See id. at 190. This asymmetry is "a salient textual difference between the
substantive liability provisions of the ADEA and Title VII," which, according to the
court, is not mentioned or recognized by the circuits that allow disparate impact claims
under the ADEA. Id.
115Id. at 190 n.9.
116 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
117 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 193 (5th Cir. 2003).
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from the ADEA. 118 Thus, the circuit court affirmed the district court's grant
of summary judgment for the defendants.
Petitioner's writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court was granted on
March 29, 2004.119 Oral arguments were held on November 3, 2004. The
Court reached its decision on March 30, 2005, affirmatively answering that
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA. The Court also
turned to former Title VII jurisprudence under Wards Cove120 in its
interpretation of the requirements for a disparate impact suit under the
ADEA.
D. A Definitive Answer: Disparate Impact Claims Under the ADEA
Requires Analysis Under Wards Cove
After years of intense dispute, a definitive answer on the above debate
has been reached. A majority of the Court, consisting of Justices Stevens,
Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Scalia, held that disparate impact claims are
recognized by the ADEA. 121 The main opinion was written by Justice
Stevens, with a concurrence by Justice Scalia. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Thomas concurred only in the judgment. 122
118 See id. "Because the broad remedial purpose behind Title VII was central to the
Court's statutory construction of Title VII in Griggs, the difference between the purposes
behind the ADEA and Title VII is directly relevant to whether a disparate impact theory
is cognizable under the ADEA." Id. For a more detailed discussion of the ADEA's
legislative history, see supra Part II.A.
119 Smith v. City of Jackson, 124 S. Ct. 1724 (2004).
120 See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
121 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005). Although Justice Stevens
wrote for the Court, his opinion with respect to the reasoning behind the availability of
disparate impact claims (Part III) is only a plurality opinion. Justice Scalia did not join in
Part III, but rather wrote a concurring opinion. His concurrence cast the fifth and deciding
vote in upholding the disparate impact cause of action.
122 Although Justice O'Connor's opinion will not be discussed in detail in this Note,
it is important to understand the basic reasoning of the opinion. Justice O'Connor's
concurrence would have held that disparate impact claims were not cognizable under the
ADEA. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1549 (O'Connor, J., concurring). O'Connor's opinion
relied on the following factors: (1) the text, history, and purpose of the ADEA indicate
that disparate impact claims were not contemplated by Congress; (2) differences between
the ADEA and Title VII imply that the ADEA should not be interpreted in the same vein
as Title VII; (3) the agencies' interpretations of the statute have never consistently
allowed for disparate impact causes of action. See id. Further analysis of each of these
arguments can be found in Part II.B.2, supra. As this group of Justices refused to
recognize disparate impact claims, it concurred in the judgment of the Court, which held
that the plaintiffs' claims should be denied. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1560.
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1. Justice Stevens's Opinion
Justice Stevens, in a section of the opinion joined only by a plurality, 123
interpreted the ADEA to include disparate impact theories of analysis. In
reaching this conclusion, the Justices relied on three factors: (1) the text and
purpose of the ADEA was similar to Title VII, which allows disparate impact
claims; 124 (2) the EEOC has consistently interpreted the ADEA to allow such
claims; 125 and (3) the RFOA provision only has meaning if disparate impact
claims are allowed.126
Justice Stevens began by looking at the similar purpose and structure of
the ADEA and Title VII. 127 The plurality relied heavily on the report of
Secretary Wirtz,128 indicating that the congressional purpose relied upon in
Griggs129 was strikingly similar to the purpose expressed by Secretary
Wirtz. 130 Specifically, just as the Griggs Court did not find racial animus to
be a problem in that case, the report of Secretary Wirtz "concluded that there
was no significant discrimination of that kind so far as older workers are
concerned."' 131 Justice Stevens also noted that the text of both the ADEA and
Title VII "focuses on the effects of the action on the employee rather than the
motivation for the action of the employer."' 132 Accordingly, Stevens found
that the outcome in Griggs highly suggested that disparate impact claims
should also be recognized under the ADEA, as the statute's purposes and text
were nearly identical. 133
The second factor upon which the plurality relied involves the EEOC's
interpretations. Noting briefly that the EEOC and the Department of Labor
had interpreted the ADEA to include disparate impact claims, Justice Stevens
123 Justices Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg joined in Part III of Justice Stevens's
opinion.
124 See supra notes 49-62.
125 See supra notes 63-68.
126 See supra note 70.
127 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1540 (2005); see also supra notes
49-62.
128 See supra notes 25-26.
129 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
130 See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1541.
131 Id. at 1542 n.5 (citing THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 25). For
further discussion of Secretary Wirtz's report, see supra notes 25-26.
132 Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1542 (emphasis in original).
133 Id.
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indicated that this was an additional factor weighing in favor of recognizing
such claims. 134
Finally, Justice Stevens relied upon the RFOA provision of the ADEA in
establishing the availability of disparate impact claims. Turning to Hazen
Paper, Justice Stevens noted that under § 4(a)(1) there is no prohibition on
discrimination on factors other than age-in other words, as long as age was
not the factor at issue, there can be no claim for disparate treatment. 135
Therefore, § 4(a)(2), which contains the RFOA provision, is pointless if only
disparate treatment causes of action are available to plaintiffs. 136 The RFOA
provision can only limit an employer's liability if used to defend a disparate
impact claim. 137
Justice Scalia also joined the final portion of Justice Stevens's opinion,
thus creating a majority. This final portion, while accepting the disparate
impact cause of action, narrowed the scope of recovery for such claims under
the ADEA. 138 The Court found the 1991 amendment to Title VII to be
particularly illuminating. 139 The 1991 amendment to Title VII was spurred
by the Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.140 Noting that
the 1991 amendment did not modify the ADEA, the Court held that the
standard announced in Wards Cove is applicable to all disparate impact
claims brought under the ADEA. 14 1
Applying the Wards Cove standard to the plaintiffs, the Court held that
the plaintiffs failed to identify a specific requirement or practice with an
adverse impact on older employees. 142 Holding that the city's reliance on
seniority and rank was reasonable in its goal of increasing the salary of junior
officers, the Court found that the decision was based on a reasonable factor
other than age. 143 Accordingly, the plaintiffs in the Smith case could not meet
134Id. at 1544.
135 Id
136 Id. ("In those disparate-treatment cases, such as in Hazen Paper itself, the RFOA
provision is simply unnecessary to avoid liability under the ADEA, since there was no
prohibited action in the first place.").
137 Id. at 1544.
138 Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1544 (2005).
139 Id. at 1545.
140 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
141 Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545. The holding in Wards Cove "narrowly construed the
employer's exposure to liability on a disparate-impact theory." Id. For further discusion
of the Wards Cove standard, see infra notes 209-13.
142 Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545.
143 Id.
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the more stringent Wards Cove standard, and the employer produced a
legitimate business justification; the plaintiffs' disparate impact claim failed.
2. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia's opinion focused on the EEOC's interpretations. Holding
that the "reasonable views" of the EEOC were entitled to Chevron
144
deference, Justice Scalia supported the agency's interpretations advocating
the availability of disparate impact suits under the ADEA.145 The statutory
language of the ADEA grants the agency the ability to issue "such rules and
regulations as it may consider necessary or appropriate."'146 Justice Scalia
found that the EEOC had upheld the availability of disparate impact claims
in three ways: (1) the agency's final interpretation supported the availability
of such claims; 147 (2) the Department of Labor, the previous administrative
agency, had also advocated the availability of such claims; 148 and (3) the
EEOC has upheld the availability of disparate impact claims as both a party
and an amicus curiae in the lower courts. 149
Justice Scalia supported the reasonableness of the agency's interpretation
by again turning to the RFOA provision. 150 Under Scalia's reading of the
clause, "the RFOA defense is relevant only as a response to employer actions
'otherwise prohibited' by the ADEA. Hence, the unavoidable meaning of the
regulation at issue is that the ADEA prohibits employer actions that have an
'adverse impact on individuals in the protected age group." ' 151 Thus, Justice
Scalia, like Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg, found that the
RFOA language to be particularly revealing. As discussed ealier, Justice
144 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
145 Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1546 (2005).
146 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000).
147 Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1547. The final regulation of the EEOC is as follows:
When an employment practice, including a test, is claimed as a basis for
different treatment of employees or applicants for employment on the grounds that it
is a "factor other than" age, and such a practice has an adverse impact on individuals
within the protected age group, it can only be justified as a business necessity....
29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (2004). Furthermore, the comments accompanying the regulation
indicate that the section had been revised to ensure that employment practices with a
disparate impact on the protected class must be justified under the business necessity
clause. 46 Fed. Reg. 47,724, 47,725 (1981) (internal citations omitted).
148 Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544. See also supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
149 Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1547 n.1.




Scalia also joined Stevens's opinion relating to the analysis under the Wards
Cove standard, and thus also agreed that the plaintiffs' claims must fail. 152
III. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
Regardless of what the Court decided in Smith, it was clear that the
implications of the decision would ripple through the lower courts and, more
importantly, through human resources departments across the country. The
effects of the decision are not to be ignored. The Court, in officially
upholding disparate impact claims under the ADEA, could have opened
employers to a flood of new litigation. Fortunately, the Court's application of
Wards Cove should limit the number of new claims facing employers.
Perhaps the most important implication of Smith was the extent to which
the Court relied upon Title VII in reaching its decision. Over the years, courts
have looked extensively to Title VII in construing various aspects of the
ADEA. The analogy between Title VII and the ADEA has been looked to for
more than just disparate impact claims. Courts have also drawn parallels
when considering, for example, the definition of "employer," 153 burden-
shifting in disparate treatment cases, 154 the interpretation of the ADEA's
bona fide occupational qualification defense, 155 and the running of the statute
of limitations for filing a claim with the EEOC. 156 Congress has also
encouraged some of the analogies, making some of the changes to Title VII
applicable to the ADEA as well. 157 The analogies have been drawn because,
from the beginning, those in favor of the ADEA urged courts to adopt Title
152 Id. at 1549.
153 See Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assoc., 104 F.3d 1256, 1263 (1 1th Cir. 1997)
("In interpreting ADEA's definition of 'employer,' Title VII cases are helpful. In
addition, most of the cases interpreting the definition of 'employer' are found in Title VII
cases. The only notable difference between the two statutes' definitions of 'employer' is
the number of 'employees' each statute requires.").
154 See Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the




157 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 imported the changes to Title VII's statute of
limitations provisions to the ADEA and changed some of the ADEA statute of limitations
sections to mirror Title VII. See Margaret M. Gembala, Note, ADEA and the Hostile
Work Environment Claim: Are the Circuit Courts Dragging Their Feet at the Expense of
the Harassed Older Worker?, 7 ELDER L.J. 341, 350 (1999).
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VII standards into the ADEA and to treat ADEA plaintiffs like African
American plaintiffs under Title VII were treated. 158
Fortunately for employers, the Court, although continuing to apply Title
VII precedent, applied a very narrow aspect of Title VII jurisprudence. In
truth, Wards Cove, although a case originally contemplating Title VII
disparate impact claims, now serves little to no purpose in Title VII claims,
as the Supreme Court has noted that the 1991 Amendment to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 effectively superseded the Wards Cove analysis. 159 This
essential "break" of Title VII precedent should shield employers from some
of the claims that might have been possible under a wider interpretation of
ADEA disparate impact claims. Among the likely implications that may now
be avoided are the possible creation of a new claim-hostile work
environment claims based on age discrimination-and problems associated
with reductions in force. This Note shall discuss each of these implications in
turn.
A. The Creation of a New Claim-Hostile Work Environment and the
ADEA
Many sexual harassment cases involve claims of a hostile work
environment. In a hostile work environment claim, an employee asserts that
"the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and
insult[]' that is [sic] 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment" 160 due
to the actions of his or her coworkers. As a result, the work atmosphere
becomes intolerable. Hostile work environment claims are considered Title
158 Rhonda M. Reaves, One of These Things is Not Like the Other: Analogizing
Ageism to Racism in Employment Discrimination Cases, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 839, 872
(2004). On the other hand, courts have not used complete uniformity in importing Title
VII meanings into the ADEA. These differences arise mostly from the differing
constitutional standards applied to race and age. For example, the two laws differ in terms
of the following: (1) uniform application of the disparate impact claim, (2) "refusal to
permit 'reverse' age discrimination cases, and [(3)] ... the inconsistent application of
relaxed pleading standards in age cases." Id. at 873-74.
159 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1545 (2005). At least one other
court has used a similar analysis. See Rossiter v. Potter, No. Civ.A. 02-12192MBB, 2005
WL 1288063, at *7 (D. Mass. May 23, 2005) (turning to pre-1991 Title VII reasoning in
upholding that a federal employee has no right to a trial by jury under the ADEA).
160 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal citations omitted)
(quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986)).
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VII actions, as the basic claim is discrimination on the basis of sex. 161 While
the cause of action has been slow to spread to other situations, if the ADEA
had continued to follow in Title VII's footsteps, employers may soon have
faced hostile work environment claims based on age discrimination as
well. 162
In fact, at least one circuit has recognized that very claim. In Crawford v.
Medina General Hospital, the Sixth Circuit found it "relatively
uncontroversial" that hostile work environment claims should be extended to
the ADEA.163 In recognizing the cause of action, the court stated the
elements of the claims as: (1) plaintiff is protected by the ADEA (i.e., forty
years or older); (2) plaintiff was harassed based on his or her age; (3) the
harassment interfered with his or her employment duties and created a hostile
work environment; and (4) the employer is liable. 64 The Seventh Circuit has
also considered the issue, but seems to have wavered on the matter. 165
161 See Meritor Say. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (After being fired,
plaintiff filed a charge under Title VII alleging that her supervisor had sexually harassed
her. The Court held that, as long as the attentions of the supervisor were unwelcomed,
then the plaintiff had a basis for the hostile work environment claim, even if any sexual
acts actually performed were voluntary. The Court thus affirmed that, whether or not
there was a quid pro quo sexual harassment situation, where conduct has the purpose or
effect of interfering with an employee's work performance or creating a hostile work
environment, the conduct can form the basis of a sexual harassment claim.).
162 See David M. Wissert & John D. Coyle, Age Discrimination May be Next
Frontier for Employers, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 29, 2002, at A29, available at
http://www.lowenstein.com/new/Agedescrimination04-29-02.pdf.
163 Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830 (6th Cir. 1996). In Crawford, the
plaintiff's claim for hostile work environment was based on statements by her supervisor
that those over age fifty-five should not work and that older people should remain quiet
and not cause problems. The plaintiff also claimed that her lack of invitation to social
gatherings was further evidence of the hostile work environment. While the Sixth Circuit
explicitly recognized the availability of hostile work environment claims under the
ADEA, the court denied the plaintiff's claims, holding that she had failed to make the
proper showing that the harassment interfered with her work or created an environment
that was objectively hostile. Id. But cf Hipp v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208,
1244-45 n.80 (11 th Cir. 2001).
164 See Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245 (1 1th Cir. 1999); Federal
Courts of Appeals Begin to Recognize Hostile Work Environment Claims Under ADEA,
http://www.saspc.com/artadea3.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2005).
165 See Wissert & Coyle, supra note 162, at A30. Even before the Sixth Circuit
recognized the availability of a hostile work environment claim under the ADEA, the
Seventh Circuit, without deciding whether such claims are available, stated that
harassment claims under the ADEA are rare and held that the plaintiff in the instant case
had failed to state a claim under the facts presented. Id. (discussing Young v. Will County
Dept. of Pub. Aid, 882 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1989)). A decade later, the Seventh Circuit
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Some commentators have claimed that, without a hostile work
environment claim, older workers who are harassed because of their age will
be left without recourse in the courts. 166 However, this ignores the fact that
there may be direct evidence of age discrimination that would allow for a
disparate treatment claim. Older workers will not be left without recourse-
the traditional claim of disparate treatment can protect their rights. 167 Even in
cases of harassment by coworkers, if the supervisor knew of the situation and
took no action, such behavior could be considered ratification of the action,
and thus satisfy the requirements of a disparate treatment claim. The only
situation in which a plaintiff would have a difficult time succeeding in a
claim of direct discrimination would be cases of coworker harassment where
the supervisor had no knowledge of the situation-a situation that may also
pose difficulties under a Title VII hostile work environment claim. 168
Because older workers are not left without recourse, it seems pointless to
recognize a new cause of action for hostile work environment under the
ADEA. However, the Sixth Circuit has done just that, and it does not seem
unreasonable that other circuits would have recognized the claim as well if
the ADEA had continued to follow in Title VII's footsteps.
If the Court had continued to follow current Title VII jurisprudence with
respect to the ADEA and had recognized disparate impact causes of action
with the same burden as Title VII claims, lower courts may have taken the
decision as directive that the two statutes should continue to be treated
similarly. Similar treatment would provide support for the proposition that
hostile work environment claims should also be recognized by the ADEA.
Thus, in allowing disparate impact causes of action, the Court may have
actually been allowing hostile work environment claims as well. The Smith
decision may have indirectly created two new and distinct causes of action
under the ADEA.
Fortunately, the Court's treatment of Wards Cove should curb the
application of hostile work environment claims to the ADEA. First, the
Supreme Court specifically departed from current Title VII precedent in
adopting the Wards Cove standard. This may indicate to lower courts that,
although the ADEA and Title VII continue to be treated similarly, identical
changed direction, stating that it had never had the opportunity to consider the availability
of such claims. Id.
166 See, e.g., Gembala, supra note 157, at 343-45.
167 Disparate impact claims may also be available, though will be difficult to prove
given the standard adopted in Smith.
168 See, e.g., Bowen v. Mo. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 311 F.3d 878, 883 (2002)
("Assuming Bowen's claim is principally one based on co-worker harassment, she must
also show that the [supervisor] knew or should have known of [the co-worker's] racially
discriminatory harassment and failed to take adequate remedial measures to end the
harassment.").
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application is not necessarily warranted. While Title VII was important to the
decision in Smith, the application of Wards Cove is a distinct and separate
analysis that is not shared by Title VII claims. By allowing ADEA
defendants to show only a reasonable business justification and not requiring
an "essential" or "indispensable" justification, the Court indicated an
unwillingness to allow expansive treatment of ADEA claims. As such, lower
courts should take the Court's decision as an indication not to quickly expand
the ADEA to other forms of claims.
However, hostile work environment claims do not share the same burden
of proof and prima facie case requirements as disparate impact claims. Thus,
the Smith decision did not directly prohibit such causes of action. Lower
courts may instead choose to interpret the Supreme Court's decision, which
again announced the similarities between the ADEA and Title VII, as the
beginning of recognition of other Title VII claims under the ADEA. Until the
issue is once again addressed in the lower courts, it is unclear from the Smith
opinion what the likely outcome will be. 169
B. The Problems with Reductions in Force
A reduction in force (RIF) is, unfortunately, a concept with which many
of today's workers are now familiar. While early projections estimate a slight
decrease in the unemployment rate for 2005,170 reductions in force will still
be an issue for today's employers. Human resource managers could have
found their tasks in implementing RIFs even more daunting if the Wards
Cove standard had not been applied to disparate impact claims under the
ADEA. To illustrate the problem, let us assume, arguendo, that the Supreme
Court had allowed disparate impact causes of actions under the ADEA but
had not applied the more restrictive Wards Cove standard.
169 At least one court may be addressing the question sooner rather than later. A pro
se plaintiff before a district court in the Eleventh Circuit has asserted, among other
claims, a hostile work environment claim under the ADEA. See Mihalik v. Expressjet
Airlines, No. 3:04cv258/RV/EMT, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15091, at *6 (N.D. Fla. June
23, 2005). Although the plaintiff has thus far avoided summary judgment, the judge's
opinion makes it clear that the plaintiff's claim may still have several obstacles to
overcome before a favorable judgment could be granted. See id. A plaintiff before a
district court in the Tenth Circuit has also been allowed to pursue the claim. See Wyatt v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., No. 04-CV-939-TCK-SAJ, 2005 WL 2508521, at *6-7
(N.D. Okla. Oct. 11, 2005) (allowing plaintiff to pursue a hostile work environment cause
of action under the ADEA).
170 Early projections estimate a 5.1% unemployment rate for the first quarter of
2005, which is projected to fall to 4.9% in the fourth quarter of 2005. Ilhan K. Geckil,
Forecasted Economic Indicators, ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP (Feb. 8, 2005),
http://www.andersoneconomicgroup.com/Pubs/forecasts/2005/forecastfeb05.htm.
1404 [Vol. 66:1375
LEARNING HOW TO STAND ON THS OWN
Currently, RIFs can create several potential legal problems, including:
(1) discrimination claims on the basis of protected criteria, including race,
age, disability, and other protected classes; (2) discrimination claims brought
under the Family and Medical Leave Act for discriminating against
employees on leave; (3) retaliation claims; (4) breach of contract claims; and
(5) Work Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN)' 7 ' claims. 172
Currently, prudent employers conduct a statistical analysis before conducting
a RIF173 in order to eliminate a problem before the RIF, and thus reduce the
risk of a lawsuit. 174 Statistical analysis is an important step because many
courts accept a statistical disparity as prima facie proof of disparate
impact. 175
Unfortunately, statistical analysis will become significantly more
difficult if employers must also analyze for disparate impact based on age.
The ADEA covers situations where one protected employee is replaced by a
younger employee who is also within the protected class. 17 6 Thus, employers
performing a statistical analysis would need to examine not only whether or
not there is an adverse impact on the entire group of employees over forty,
but also whether there is an impact on a subgroup of the protected class.
Many have observed that this would create a statistical nightmare, as there
are unlimited subgroups that could theoretically be analyzed for statistical
disparity.' 77 In fact, it could be impossible for an employer to completely
analyze the situation through statistics.
171 Work Adjustment and Retraining Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109). WARN poses a problem for RIFs because the Act
contains "complicated definitions and creates many potential traps." Dan Wilczek, Key
Steps for Employers in Effective Downsizing,
http://www.faegre.com/articles/article_1022.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2005). WARN
requires notice for plant closings and major layoffs. Id. Adding to the legal confusion is
the fact that courts have interpreted the law in various ways. Id.
172 Wilczek, supra note 171.
173 See Allan G. King, Statistics as a Guide to RIF Selections: Caveat Emptor, 20
LABOR LAW. 79, 79 (2004).
174 Id.
175 Id. at 80. Courts will accept disparities that "are so great that a random process
would produce them no more than five percent of the time." Id. at 79. Such disparities are
considered statistically significant and generally considered to be probative in
discrimination cases. Id. at 79-80.
176 See O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996) ("The
fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the protected
class is thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his age.").
177 The ADEA operates to protect any individual over forty who was detrimentally
affected by an employment action that favors a younger individual. Id. at 312. This result
means that if a protected individual loses out to a younger individual because of age, even
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Circuits that recognized the disparate impact theory prior to Smith had
generally applied two standards of analysis to see if the RIF had an adverse
impact on older workers.178 The first standard was the four-fifths rule, which
has been approved by the EEOC. 179 Under this rule, "an adverse impact is
presumed to exist where the retention rate of older workers under an
[involuntary reduction in force] is less than four-fifths, or 80 percent, of the
retention rate of younger workers."'180 The other analysis used was a standard
deviation analysis, in which the actual results are compared to a so-called
expected result.181 Such statistical information can be important because
federal provisions require employers to provide discharged employees in the
protected age class with statistical information regarding the RIF after the
employee's discharge.182 While statistical analysis provides only a rebuttable
presumption of disparate impact, it does provide a sufficient basis upon
which to base a claim. Thus, the statistical information can be enough to shift
the burden back to the employer to prove that the RIF was based on a
reasonable factor other than age.
But this is where the bulk of the problem lies. Statistical information is
sufficient to get a disparate impact claim into court. 183 Courts have long
since recognized that direct evidence of employment discrimination may not
be available. In such cases, a plaintiff who can establish a prima facie case
then shifts the burden to the defendant. 184 The requirements for the plaintiff's
if that younger individual is also in the protected class, the ADEA has still been violated.
See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 584 (2004) ("[The ADEA]
forbids discriminatory preference for the young over the old."). See also O'Connor, 517
U.S. at 312.
The fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the
protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his age. Or to
put the point more concretely, there can be no greater inference of age
discrimination (as opposed to "40 or over" discrimination) when a 40-year-old is
replaced by a 39-year-old than when a 56-year-old is replaced by a 40-year-old.
Id.
178 As of this Note's publication date, no court has reconsidered the issue.
179 Marcia K. Keegan, United States: Important New Second Circuit ADEA




182 See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104
Stat. 978 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000)).
183 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1544-45 (2005). See also supra
notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
184 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Tex. Dep't of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
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prima facie case were first laid out in race discrimination cases. Under this
structure, known as the McDonnell Douglas formula, to make a prima facie
case of discrimination, plaintiffs must prove the following: (1) the plaintiff is
a member of the protected class, (2) the plaintiff applied and was qualified
for the position for which the employer defendant was accepting
applications, (3) the plaintiff was rejected, and (4) after the plaintiff's
rejection, the position continued to remain open and the employer continued
to accept applications from persons who were as qualified as the plaintiff.185
All twelve circuits have since accepted the McDonnell Douglas formula, in
some form, in ADEA cases as well. 186
RIF terminations are treated slightly differently than is an isolated
discharge.' 87 Under the ADEA, a prima facie case in a RIF action requires
the plaintiff to show the following: (1) the plaintiff was a member of the
protected group (here, age forty and over), (2) the plaintiff was meeting the
employer's legitimate expectations, (3) the plaintiff was discharged, and
(4) similarly situated, albeit younger, employees were not discharged.188
If the plaintiff can establish the prima facie case, employer-defendants
are then forced to defend the RIF in court. The use of statistics is a
circumstantial method of proof that the employer intended to discriminate in
the RIF. Statistics that open the door may be available in a wide variety of
cases because so many factors, on which many RIFs are routinely based, are
associated with age. Consider, for example, the correlation of age with
pension, benefits, and salary. The high costs associated with these factors are
often motivating forces in designing a RIF. While each of these factors is
considered a reasonable factor other than age, 189 statistical data alone are
sufficient information to begin a claim and force the employer to defend its
185 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (footnote omitted).
186 O'Meara, supra note 16, at 102.
187 See generally Duane E. Thompson et al., Age Discrimination in Reduction-in-
Force: The Metamorphosis of McDonnell Douglas Continues, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 46
(1996).
188 Townsend v. Weyerhaeuser Co., No. 04-C-563-Lg, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11767, at *30 (W.D. Wis. June 13, 2005); Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., 152 F.3d 723, 728
(7th Cir. 1998); see also Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 493-94 (7th Cir. 2000).
189 While it is true that pension, benefits, salary, and other factors are likely to be
correlated with age, the Supreme Court has held that as long as, for example, pension is
not merely a proxy for age, the employer may legitimately act on that factor. See Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612 (1993) ("[The ADEA] requires the employer to
ignore an employee's age (absent a statutory exemption or defense); it does not specify
further characteristics that an employer must also ignore.") (emphasis in original).
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action. 190 Such data are particularly the type of information that discharged
employees could request because a RIF based on these considerations would
indicate that the action had a disparate impact on older employees.
Thus, an employer, looking at statistical information that indicates that
the planned RIF may have an adverse impact on older employees, may
consider revising the RIF to avoid the possible legal challenge. However,
employers may face additional problems in revising the RIF. The employees
who traditionally have received the protections of the ADEA are older white
males. 191 In shifting the RIF to reduce the impact on workers protected by
the ADEA, the. RIF is likely to fall more harshly upon workers who have
entered the workforce within the last twenty years. 192 Among the fastest
growing groups entering the workforce over the last few years are women
190 Title VII disparate impact cases have made it very clear that statistical analysis is
critical to a disparate impact claim. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 339 (1977). Many courts have made it clear that, under the ADEA, statistical
evidence provided the basis for a disparate impact claim. See, e.g., Caron v. Scott Paper
Co., 834 F. Supp. 33, 39 (D. Me. 1993) (holding that the evidence showed statistical
disparity that was substantive enough to raise the inference of causation; defendant's
challenges of the statistical evidence merely indicated that there were genuine issues of
material facts); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the trial
court is in the position to fully assess the facts and circumstances surrounding the
statistical evidence presented); Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470 (9th
Cir. 1995) (holding that the disparate impact claim was an appropriate vehicle for the
introduction of statistical evidence and that statistical information is admissible and can
prove a prima facie case under either the disparate impact or disparate treatment theory).
Contra Aylward v. Hyatt Corp., No. 03 C 6097, 2005 WL 1910904, at *14-15 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 5, 2005) (holding that plaintiffs failed to adequately support the disparate impact
claim with relevant statistics from the RIF).
191 See O'Meara, supra note 16, at 24-29.
192 This effect is a result of the changing workforce. For example, the number of
women employed in the workplace has more than doubled since 1970 (increasing from
29,688,000 employed women in 1970 to 63,582,000 employed women in 2002). BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, available
at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-tables2.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2005). In comparison, the
male workforce has only grown 1.5 times in size (from 48,990,000 employed males in
1970 to 72,903,000 employed males in 2002). Id. Other groups, such as the Hispanic
population, have also grown significantly in the workplace. For example" in 1995, there
were 11,127,000 employed Hispanic workers over age sixteen in the workforce. BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, available at
http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab3.htm (under the subtitle "Hispanic or Latino
Ethnicity," retrieve data for "Employed" and "Not seasonally adjusted") (last visited
Nov. 22, 2005). By 2004, there were 17,930,000 employed Hispanic workers over age 16
in the workforce. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, CURRENT
POPULATION SURVEY, available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat4.pdf (last visited Nov.
22, 2005).
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and minorities.' 93 Women and minorities have always been protected by
Title VII and continue to have a disparate impact cause of action available in
their legal arsenal. 194 Thus, an attempt to redesign a RIF in order to avoid an
ADEA disparate impact claim may shift the burden to females and
minorities, who then may have a legal cause for a Title VII disparate impact
claim. This is consistent with the fact that the group provided the greatest
protection by the ADEA is Caucasian, white-collar males. 195 Once again, the
employer is forced to defend its actions in court.
This unfortunate reality is made more difficult by the fact that there are
no official guidelines in place to help employers navigate a RIF.
196
Furthermore, the mechanics of such RIFs are often not addressed in
personnel literature.' 97 Because of the underlying problems and lack of
guidelines, "virtually every organization undergoing a RIF is susceptible to
complaints of age discrimination."'' 9 8
A decision in the Second Circuit fueled this growing fear. In Meacham v.
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory,'99 twenty-six former employees, all over
age forty, challenged the involuntary RIF under the ADEA.200 In conducting
the RIF, Knolls relied upon criteria such as "flexibility."'201 After creating the
criteria and having managers rank the employees, the employer conducted a
disparate impact analysis by analyzing the average age of the workplace both
before and after the RIF; legal counsel also reviewed the RIF and spoke with
193 See supra note 192.
194 Women and minorities are protected under Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of
1991 codified the availability of disparate impact causes of action under Title VII. See
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000)).
195 See O'Meara, supra note 16, at 24-29.
196 Peter H. Wingate et al., Organizational Downsizing and Age Discrimination
Litigation: The Influence of Personnel Practices and Statistical Evidence on Litigation
Outcomes, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 87, 88 (2003) ("Unlike selection, test construction,
or validation situations, there are no uniform scientific or government sponsored
guidelines to aid an organization in conducting a valid and fair RIF in a legally defensible
manner.") (internal citations omitted).
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 381 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2004), vacated and
remanded, KAPL, Inc. v. Meacham, 125 S. Ct. 1731 (2005) (The Court vacated and
remanded in light of the decision in Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).).
200 Knolls Atomic PowerLab., 381 F.3d at 61.
20 1 Id. at 63.
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some of the managers who created the rankings.20 2 The court, in upholding
the jury verdict for the plaintiffs, held that:
[I]f a particular criterion is subjective (as "flexibility" and "criticality" are),
and if (as here) evidence shows that (i) the subjectivity disproportionately
impacted older employees; (ii) the employer observed that the disproportion
was gross and obvious; and (iii) the employer did nothing to audit or
validate the results, then an employer may be liable for discrimination if
equally effective alternatives to the challenged features of the employment
practice are available. 203
The employees were also awarded liquidated damages, as the court
agreed that Knolls willfully violated the ADEA because the company failed
to properly test the RIF for age discrimination. 204 The company, according to
the court, "should have compared the age composition of the pool from
which the laid off employees were selected with the age composition of the
group ultimately selected for layoff. '205
After Smith, the Supreme Court, on writ of certiorari, vacated and
remanded the opinion of the Second Circuit for reconsideration. 206 However,
still assuming, arguendo, that Smith allowed disparate impact claims without
applying the Wards Cove standard, this decision would have significant
implications for employers looking to conduct a RIF. Prior to implementing a
RIF, employers will be well-advised to perform the following steps:
(1) choose objective criteria, to the extent possible, and thoroughly define
any subjective criteria that are necessary; (2) perform disparate impact
analysis to look for any statistically significant differences in the number of
persons affected who belong to a protected class and those who do not;
(3) where a disparate impact exists, employers should review the RIF to
ensure that the selection criteria did not create the discriminatory effect and
also hold discussions with all of the managers who made decisions in
creating the RIF.207 If nothing else, the decision made it clear that managers
and human resource managers are well-advised to seek legal advice and
training in what constitutes a proper RIF.
Thus, the allowance of disparate impact claims under the ADEA could
have served to increase the number of lawsuits employers are forced to
202 Id. at 64-65.
203 Id. at 75.
204 Keegan, supra note 179.
205 Id.
206 KAPL, Inc. v. Meacham, 125 S. Ct. 1731 (2005).
207 Keegan, supra note 179.
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defend. While not all of the cases would necessarily be meritorious,
employers would still need to spend valuable resources to defend the claims.
Employers would be well-advised to either get the claims dismissed or settle
out of court-age discrimination plaintiffs have traditionally faired better in
front of juries than other discrimination plaintiffs. 20 8 In this manner, opening
the courts to ADEA disparate impact claims without the Wards Cove
standard would have increased the amount of employment litigation in the
courts and required employers to spend greater amounts of time and money
defending or settling lawsuits.
Fortunately for employers, the application of the Wards Cove standard
may save employers from some of the troubles arising from reductions in
force. In Wards Cove, cannery workers brought a disparate impact claim,
alleging that they were treated unfairly on the basis of race.209 The statistics
showed that there were more minority workers in the cannery positions than
in the non-cannery positions.210 Although the circuit court held that this
statistical evidence established a prima facie case, the Supreme Court held
that "a comparison between the percentage of cannery workers who are
nonwhite and the percentage of noncannery workers who are nonwhite [does
not] make[] out a prima facie case of disparate impact. ' 211
Although the Court remanded to reconsider a prima facie case based on
statistical evidence, the remainder of the opinion is equally important. 212 The
Court reaffirmed that the disparate impact plaintiff's
burden in establishing a prima facie case goes beyond the need to show that
there are statistical disparities in the employer's work force. The plaintiff
must begin by identifying the specific employment practice that is
challenged.... Especially in cases where an employer combines subjective
criteria with the use of more rigid standardized rules or tests, the plaintiff is
in our view responsible for isolating and identifying the specific
employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed
statistical disparities.213
208 See Wilczek, supra note 171 (describing two large settlements of 2002-
Gulfstream Aerospace's agreement to pay $2.1 million to sixty-one employees over the
age of forty; Footlocker's $3.1 million settlement to quiet claims that it purposefully
replaced older workers with younger workers).
209 See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1989).
210 See id. at 650 n.5.
211 Id. at 655.
212 See id.
213 Id. at 656 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994
(1988)).
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Thus, under the ADEA, disparate impact plaintiffs must establish a specific
employment practice that is being challenged.214 As the Court noticed,
holding otherwise would allow employers to be held liable for "the myriad of
innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances in the composition of
their work forces. '215 ADEA disparate impact plaintiffs in RIF cases,
therefore, will bear the ultimate burden of persuasion and must establish a
prima facie case indicating both relevant statistics and a specific employment
practice, and not a general effect, that resulted in the disparate impact. 216 As
more than sheer statistical information is required, plaintiffs cannot simply
rely on the required disclosures. 217 For example, plaintiffs cannot simply
allege that older workers were disparately impacted due to greater cost
savings, as the plaintiffs have not alleged a specific employment practice. 218
This is not to say that such claims will be impossible to bring. Plaintiffs
may still be able to create a prima facie case and meet the initial burden.
However, Wards Cove also made it easier for employers to defend disparate
impact cases. 219 Employers need only prove that "a challenged practice
serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the
employer." 220 As at least one district court has noted in the wake of Smith:
"[A]n employer that decides to terminate an employee to relieve itself of the
burden of that employee's high salary or health care costs has based its
decision on 'reasonable factors' other than the employee's age."'221 Thus, the
Court's specific reference to Wards Cove, establishing that defendants in
disparate impact cases need only point to a reasonable business justification,
should reduce the burden on employers. The Court in Smith specifically
noted that employers should not be liable for the "myriad of innocent causes
214 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1545 (2005); see also Williams v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 03-2200-JWL, 2005 WL 1801605, at *2 (D. Kan. July 29,
2005) (holding that plaintiffs need not point to a specific part of the "alpha rating system"
in order to allege a disparate impact claim but that the alpha rating system was a specific
employment practice that could be challenged); Durante v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 03-
56255, 2005 WL 1799416, at *2-3 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 2005) (holding that the plaintiffs
failed to point to a specific employment practice using solely subjective criteria in
challenging the RIF).
215 Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. at 992.
216 See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545.
217 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
218 See Townsend v. Weyerhaeuser Co., No. 04-C-563-Lg, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11767, at *39 (W.D. Wis. June 13, 2005).
219 See supra note 56.
220 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
221 Townsend, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11767, at *40.
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that may lead to statistical imbalances." 222 The increased burden on plaintiffs
and the relatively easy standard for defendants combine to make disparate
impact cases difficult to bring, particularly in the context of reductions in
force.223 If a claim is brought, many employers will succeed at the summary
judgment stage, thus eliminating the need for a trial and/or settlement offer.
Because summary judgment can eliminate many of the costs associated with
litigation, employers should not be facing increased litigation costs. Further,
employers need not be so fearful of ADEA disparate impact cases and
therefore attempt to shift any impact to other groups-including women and
minorities. In fact, given that the Wards Cove standard applies only to ADEA
plaintiffs and that Title VII plaintiffs are generally afforded more protections,
employers will find it against their interests to attempt to shift any of the
impact of the RIF to these other groups.
IV. CONCLUSION
It was clear that, regardless of what the Court decided, Smith v. City of
Jackson would reshape the employment law landscape. In particular, if the
Court had recognized the cause of action and not applied the Wards Cove
standard, employers could suddenly have been open to many new claims,
including the relatively new claim of a hostile work environment based on
age discrimination. If employers are forced into court or into settlements,
more of their resources will be diverted from the actual workforce. Thus,
continuing lawsuits may only increase the number or severity of RIFs that
employers will implement over the coming years.
Thus, the Court was well-advised to decide in favor of the employer in
Smith. Although the disparate impact cause of action under the ADEA was
recognized, the application of the Wards Cove standard should serve to limit
the threat of litigation facing employers. While the ADEA and Title VII have
been construed to have similar provisions, the ADEA must one day separate
itself from Title VII. As the ADEA does not expansively recognize disparate
impact claims, and, by extension, hostile work environment claims, the
statute is finally on its way to standing on its own without continued support
from Title VII. In the end, the differences between race and age, noted both
by the Court224 and by commentators, 225 should begin to distinguish between
222 Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1545 (2005).
223 At least one district court has already ruled against a plaintiff in a disparate
impact reduction in force case, relying on the Smith decision. See Townsend, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11767, at *37-41.
224 See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 540 U.S. 581, 597-98 (2004).
225 See Reaves, supra note 122, at 158.
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the two discrimination statutes. While it may be easy for Title VII and the
ADEA to be interpreted similarly, and indeed the shared language may
require reference to the other statute at times, the ADEA will only fully
develop when it has an independent line of jurisprudence free from the
impact of Title VII. The Smith v. City of Jackson decision may very well
serve as the ADEA's first step on its own.
